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Information Technology and Industry Concentration 
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Abstract: Industry concentration has been rising in the US since 1980. Firm 
operating margins have also been rising. Are these signs of declining competition that call 
for a new antitrust policy? This paper explores the role of proprietary information 
technology systems (IT), which could increase industry concentration and margins by raising 
the productivity of top firms relative to others. Using instrumental variable estimates, this 
paper finds that IT system use is strongly associated with the level and growth of industry 
concentration and firm operating margins. The paper also finds that IT system use is 
associated with relatively larger establishment size and labor productivity for the top four 
firms in each industry. Successful IT systems appear to play a major role in the recent 
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Industry concentration has been rising across sectors in the US since the 1980s. 
Autor et al. (2017) find that from 1982 to 2012 the share of shipments made by the top four 
firms in four-digit industries grew 4.5% in manufacturing industries, 4.4% in service 
industries, 15.0% in retail industries, and 2.1% in the wholesale sector.1 What is driving this 
change and what is its significance? 
Some see rising concentration as a sign of decreasing competition that might lead to 
higher prices, less innovation, and greater wage inequality.2 This view is bolstered by 
evidence of a concomitant rise in profit margins and markups (Rognlie 2015, Barkai 2016, de 
Loecker and Eeckhout 2017). Figure 1 shows the recent rise in profits. The black line, also 
drawn from the National Accounts, represents the ratio of the net operating surplus to gross 
value added for the corporate sector (nonfinancial and financial). The gray line is the ratio of 
aggregate operating income after depreciation to revenues for firms publicly listed in the US. 
Rising profit margins might also be a sign of declining competition. 
However, that is not necessarily the case. The interpretation depends on what is 
causing the rise in industry concentration and firm profit margins. Declining competition is 
one possibility. Grullon et al. (2016) attribute the rise in industry concentration partly to lax 
antitrust enforcement of mergers and acquisitions. Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) suggest 
that growing federal regulation might be creating entry barriers, also reducing competition. If 
these views are right, then perhaps antitrust enforcement needs to be strengthened or other 
policy changes made to increase competition. 
But another possibility is that some firms—but not all—benefit significantly from 
new technologies. Thanks to new technology, these firms earn higher profits and realize 
                                                
1 See also White and Yang (2017) on trends in aggregate concentration. 
2 The Economist, “Too much of a good thing,” March 26, 2016. 
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larger market share, hence higher concentration. In a careful analysis, Autor et al. (2017) find 
strong evidence that market share is being reallocated to “superstar” firms that outperform 
rivals. In this case, the superior performance of these leading firms might result from greater 
innovation and social benefit. But what might be causing this reallocation? The authors 
speculate that the underlying cause might actually be greater competition caused by 
globalization or better comparative price information made available by the Internet or other 
technology. In their model, greater competition, captured by an increase in the elasticity of 
demand, increases the market advantage of more productive firms.  
Yet greater competition does not seem to entirely explain the reallocation. For one 
thing, if greater competition were driving the rise in industry concentration, we might expect 
this effect to be greatest in those industries most affected by global trade. The evidence, 
however, suggests that industry concentration is increasing across almost all sectors.3 
Furthermore, additional factors seem to be affecting the market share of superstar firms. 
Several studies point to a growing divergence in firm productivity within industries; the gap 
between the top performing firms and the rest is growing (Andrews et al. 2016; Berlingieri et 
al. 2017, Decker et al. 2017). Thus, resources might also be shifting to superstar firms as 
their relative productivity grows.  
This paper explores a possible source of the reallocation: information technology 
systems (IT). The focus is not on general spending on information technology, but 
specifically on the role of proprietary mission-critical IT systems. Firms may have 
heterogeneous abilities to develop cutting edge IT systems because they have managers or 
software developers with different abilities. Also, software development typically requires 
                                                
3 See Autor et al. (2017) and Table A1. 
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large upfront fixed costs but has low marginal costs. Because of this cost structure, IT 
systems can have large economies of scale. In addition, some IT systems might exploit 
network effects. For example, Hughes and Mester (2013) see both fixed IT development 
costs and network effects in payment systems contributing to substantial scale economies in 
banking. Similarly, IT systems have helped Walmart achieve more efficient logistics, higher 
turnover of inventory, and greater product variety at lower cost.  
These proprietary IT systems used by large banks and Walmart are crucially different 
from the general use of IT because they provide competitive advantage. By contrast, for 
example, many restaurants use off-the-shelf point of sale systems. These provide improved 
service but, because these systems are also widely available to competitors, they are not likely 
to provide a substantial competitive advantage that allows a restaurant to gain substantial 
market share. But firms with successful proprietary systems might well grow faster than 
other firms in the same industry. Proprietary IT thus provides a specific mechanism that can 
help explain the reallocation to more productive firms, rising industry concentration, also 
growing productivity dispersion between firms within industries, and growing profit margins. 
Below I proxy the use of proprietary systems by the share of the workforce consisting of 
software developers and related occupations. Firms using off-the-shelf IT will not tend to 
employ software developers; firms building proprietary systems will, on average.4 
When the scale economies and network effects of proprietary systems are particularly 
strong, they may give rise to “winner-take-all” or “winner-take-most” markets. For example, 
IT platforms enable Amazon to dominate the market for online retail (Khan 2017). But are 
such big tech markets unusual or is IT creating such dominant winners across many 
                                                
4 Firms can also contract with third parties for proprietary systems; I find that at an industry level, purchased IT 
systems are correlated with inhouse development. 
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economic sectors? Concerns about a general IT-based trend to market domination provides 
another reason to explore the link between IT and rising industry concentration. This paper 
focuses on IT systems use across all industries where the technology is used, excluding 
industries involved in producing information technology itself. 
The paper explores the impact of IT systems using a model with fixed costs of 
production, monopolistic competition in a differentiated product market, and heterogeneous 
productivity. If industries that use IT systems tend to have greater dispersion of plant-level 
productivity, then the model shows that these industries should have greater industry 
concentration and that the top firms in these industries should have relatively larger revenues 
and higher labor productivity.  
The empirical analysis makes three key findings:  
1. Industry use of IT systems is associated with higher industry concentration 
ratios (shares of sales to the top firms) and with more rapid growth in 
concentration ratios. The effect is large—it accounts for most of the 
observed rise in concentration ratios—and an instrumental variable analysis 
provides some evidence that the relationship is causal. In contrast, measures 
of merger and acquisition activity and of entry are at best only weakly 
associated with changes in concentration. 
2. IT systems use is strongly associated with the growth in operating profit 
margins of publicly listed firms from 2000 to 2014 and this effect can 
account for most of that growth. Once IT and intangibles are taken into 
account, the residual trend is not positive, weighing against a general decline 
in competition as the source of the increase in margins. 
3. Industry use of IT systems is associated with larger revenues per 
establishment and higher labor productivity among the top four firms within 
each industry, both in absolute terms and relative to other firms in the 
industry. 
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These findings suggest that technology plays a major role in rising industry 
concentration and rising firm profit margins. 
Literature 
Of course, concerns about rising industry concentration and its effects are not new. 
Demsetz (1973) argued that high industry concentration might be a sign of superior 
performance rather than an indicator of insufficient competition. In the 1970s, Peltzman 
(1977) documented rising concentration in manufacturing industries, argued that these 
increases were largely the result of technological progress, and therefore antitrust authorities 
need not be concerned. Scherer (1979) attributed the increases largely to economies of scale, 
arguing that antitrust authorities could distinguish genuine scale economies from attempts to 
limit competition through acquisition. This period gave rise to a large literature using cross-
industry studies to explore the interrelationships between market structure, firm conduct, 
and firm performance (see Curry and George 1983 and Schmalensee 1989 for reviews). Bain 
(1956) identified scale economies as one source of entry barriers. Comanor and Wilson 
(1967) and many others proxied scale economies by using the ratio of the output of a plant 
of minimum efficient size to the output of the entire industry; minimum efficient size was 
estimated from the distribution of plant sizes under some assumptions. But these studies did 
not actually identify a technological scale economy. Also, as Schmalensee (1989) argues, 
almost all of the variables used in these studies are endogenously determined, limiting the 
usefulness of the studies for policy analysis. 
This paper focuses on a particular technology that can generate scale economies. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of the impact of IT might similarly suffer from endogeneity. After 
1980, rapidly declining prices for computing exogenously gave rise to the widespread 
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adoption of computers. However, the relative adoption across industries might be affected 
endogenously by existing industry structure. For instance, industries with larger 
establishments might have had greater need for computers to manage their production. To 
obtain identification, I use an instrumental variable that is arguably independent of industry 
structure. 
This paper is related to the large literature on productivity dispersion within 
industries and, in particular, to several papers showing a growing divergence in firm 
productivity (Andrews et al. 2016; Berlingieri et al. 2017) and growing dispersion in returns 
to capital (Furman and Orszag 2015). Other papers specifically find that the growth in the 
dispersion of productivity and wages is at least partly accounted for by information 
technology (Abowd et al. 2007; Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997; Dunne et al. 2004). The 
findings on wages are consistent with research showing that a substantial part of the growth 
in wage inequality is associated with differences between firms or establishments (Abowd, 
Kramarz, and Margolis 1999; Barth et al. 2016; Dunne et al. 2004; Mueller et al. 2015; Song 
et al. 2015). 
A key question is why information technology should be associated with widely 
disparate levels of productivity. While the hardware components of IT systems are usually 
generic commodities, the systems themselves typically involve proprietary software and 
complementary human or organizational capital. There is a significant literature that 
identifies IT-related differences in productivity arising from complementary skills, 
managerial practices, and business models that are themselves unevenly distributed 
(including Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007; Bloom et al. 2012; Bloom et al. 2014; Bloom 
et al. 2017; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002; Brynjolfsson et al. 2008; Caroli and van 
Reenen 2001; and Crespi, Criscuolo, and Haskel 2017). Bessen (2015) argues that skills and 
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managerial knowledge needed to use major new technologies have often been unevenly 
distributed initially because much must be learned through experience, which tends to differ 
substantially from firm to firm. While this paper does not explore the reasons why IT 
systems might have diverse effects on productivity, the findings here reinforce the notion 
that those differences are significant. 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2008) find that all industries exhibit growth in concentration 
from 1996-2006 but that IT intensive industries show somewhat faster growth on average 
during this period.5 The present paper goes beyond this by using a more detailed set of 
industries, using instrumental variables, and performing a supplementary analysis on 
differences between the top firms and the rest within each industry. Kurz (2017) also argues 
that IT has contributed to growing market power, but only identifies IT by sector. 
Finally, Tambe and Hitt (2012) and Harrigan et al. (2016) also use the employment 




Information technology has been widely adopted across industries since the 1970s 
thanks, in great part, to the dramatic decline in the price of computing. However, as the 
price of computers has declined, firm IT investment has shifted increasingly to software and, 
in particular, to custom applications. Nearly three quarters of all software investment is made 
                                                
5 Their measure of concentration is a Herfindahl index based on Compustat data. 
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by firms purchasing custom systems or developing their own applications.6 This suggests 
that firms may be investing heavily in proprietary systems that have large fixed costs but low 
marginal costs, giving rise to economies of scale.7 These are investments in technology that 
are not readily available to product market rivals, giving rise to heterogeneous firm 
productivity with implications for industry structure. Such investments have occurred in the 
past, even in the early years of computing, but the level of investment has grown 
dramatically over the last several decades.8 
In line with this view, this paper advances the specific hypothesis that the more that 
industries use information technology systems the more they will have, all else equal, greater 
productivity dispersion between firms. IT will generate greater productivity dispersion if the 
systems depend on complementary managerial or technical skills that are not easily acquired 
on the labor market. Firms’ access to workers with critical skills may be heterogeneous if the 
technology is not standardized and key skills are learned on the job (Bessen 2015, 2016). In 
any case, some evidence suggests that wage and productivity dispersion between plants are, 
in fact, related to information technology (Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997; Dunne et al. 
2004). 
                                                
6 For 2014, custom applications including own developed accounted for 73% of investment in software by 
private industry and government, see BEA estimates at http://www.bea.gov/national/info_comm_tech.htm. 
7 Note that economies of scale could arise even from generic technology. For instance, mainframe computers 
that could handle high volumes of transactions required substantial fixed costs. But these sources of advantage 
sometimes dissipate over time, for instance, as time sharing services made mainframe technology available to 
smaller firms. The notion here is that much of the focus of IT development seems to be directed toward 
proprietary systems and these systems may be slower to diffuse to rivals.  
8 For instance, from 1977 to 2002 the mean IT share of the workforce in manufacturing industries increased 
threefold (see Table 6) 
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Production 
To explore the implications of this hypothesis, I use a model that is a simplified, 
static version of models developed by Bartelsman et al. (2013) to study productivity 
dispersion across countries and used by Autor et al. (2017) to study the link between industry 
concentration and labor’s share of output. The key distinguishing features of the model are 
fixed and variable costs of production, heterogeneous differences in productivity, and 
monopolistic competition. Let total labor for firm i consist of the sum of variable labor, V, 
and fixed labor, F:9 𝐿" = 𝑉" + 𝐹. 
The output of a plant is determined by a production function employing variable 
labor:  𝑌" = 𝐴"𝑉"*,							0 < 𝛾 < 1 
where 𝐴" represents the firm’s heterogeneous productivity, and 𝛾 is less than one to 
capture decreasing returns to production.10 Firms may have multiple plants with the same 𝐴" 
for each plant. 
Assume that each plant produces a single variety of a differentiated product and the 
representative consumer’s utility is a constant elasticity of substitution function over 
varieties: 
𝑈 = 𝑌"2"
3 2 ,									0 < 𝜎 < 1. 
                                                
9 I assume uniform fixed costs across all firms in the industry. IT systems might involve greater fixed costs, 
however, incorporating variable fixed costs associated with higher productivity would not change the key 
results here. 
10 I model firms and plants this way because the connection between scale economies and industry 
concentration concerns plant size (Eckard 1994). 
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It is straightforward to show that utility maximization leads to an inverse demand 
(price) function for variety i of the form 
𝑃" = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑌"83 9,						𝜌 = 11 − 𝜎 > 1 
where 𝜌 is the price elasticity of demand. Given wage, w, the firm seeks to maximize 
profits, 𝜋" = 𝑃"𝑌" − 𝑤𝑉" − 𝑤𝐹. 
Solving the first order maximizing condition (see Appendix), three properties can be 
shown:  
• Given positive fixed costs, higher productivity firms will have higher operating 
margins.  
• Firms with higher productivity, 𝐴" , will have greater revenues, 𝑅" ≡ 𝑃" ∙ 𝑌" . Assuming 
that larger firms also have larger establishments, higher productivity firms will have 
greater revenues per establishment.11 
• Given positive fixed costs, higher productivity firms will have greater output per 
worker, 𝑅" 𝐿".  
These properties provide ways to test whether IT systems use is associated with a 
growing productivity gap between the top firms in an industry and the rest. My hypothesis 
assumes that IT-intensive industries will, all else equal, have higher productivity and the top 
firms in IT-intensive industries will have even higher productivity relative to the rest. Thus, it 
should follow that IT-intensive industries should have greater revenues, with greater output 
per worker and higher operating margins on average and these effects should be even larger 
for the largest firms within these industries. 
                                                
11 It is possible, of course, that larger firms could simply have more establishments of the same size. This would 
be the case if the economies of scale were purely economies in the management of the number of 
establishments. Eckard (1994) finds evidence that industry concentration is mainly associated with larger 
establishment size rather than more establishments per firm. I make the assumption that a substantial portion 
of the increase in firm revenues caused by greater productivity arises from larger establishment size. 
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If the top firms within an industry have greater productivity relative to the rest, then 
the industry will exhibit higher concentration. That is, if, say, the top four firms have higher 
productivity, then they will also have relatively larger revenues, all else equal. And their share 
of revenues, the concentration ratio, will also be larger. From this it follows that if IT use 
leads to greater productivity dispersion, it will also lead to greater industry concentration. 
On the other hand, other factors also influence industry concentration and might be 
responsible for the rise. For example, if rising concentration is driven mainly by merger and 
acquisition activity, then industries with more M&A activity should show greater 
concentration, all else equal. Or rising entry barriers might reduce the number of industry 
establishments, also raising concentration. Below I explore whether such factors are 
associated with industry concentration, suggesting alternatives to an explanation based on 
rising productivity differences. 
Data 
The concentration data come from the Economic Census reports for 1997, 2002, 
2007, and 2012. The Census reports the share of industry revenues (or shipments) going to 
the top 4, 8, 20, and 50 firms in each NAICS industry at the 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 digit levels.12 In 
addition, it reports the number of establishments, annual payroll, and number of employees 
for the industry as a whole and for the top firms within the industry (the latter data are 
missing for manufacturing industries). I also use data from the 1977 Economic Census for 
the manufacturing sector. 
                                                
12 I use industry concentration by revenues rather than by value added because the revenue measure 
corresponds more directly with the model. 
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The Economic Census data have the advantage that they count all firms and 
establishments in each industry. Some studies have used concentration ratios computed for 
publicly firms listed in Compustat (Grullon et al. 2016; Guttierez and Philippon 2017). 
Those data have the advantage of being available annually and for a longer period of time. 
But they also have some disadvantages: Compustat typically reports worldwide sales, not 
domestic sales, and the sample excludes private firms. If we want to analyze concentration in 
domestic markets, it can be misleading to use measures based on international sales. And it 
appears that private firms make a large difference. The Compustat concentration ratios are 
only weakly correlated with the ratios provided by the Economic Census.13 To avoid 
conflating issues about concentration with issues about firms’ changing preferences about 
being publicly listed and firms’ changing international exposure, I decided to employ the 
Economic Census data. 
The paper seeks to capture the extent to which firms use proprietary IT systems. 
This activity is distinct from investment in IT for general uses such as word processing or 
telecommunications. Firms building proprietary systems will typically hire software 
developers and systems analysts to design, build, and maintain these systems even if much of 
the work is done by outside contractors. General computer use for common office 
applications does not require such personnel. Proprietary systems might incorporate off-the-
shelf components including software (e.g., SAP software), but these components are 
bundled with firm-specific software. I assume that in-house software development is 
correlated with the use of contractors so that at an industry level the use of proprietary IT 
systems is reflected in the composition of the workforce. This variable is correlated with 
                                                
13 I ran several tests. For example, I calculated the Compustat four-firm concentration ratios for 2012 for three-
digit NAICS industries. The correlation coefficient between these data and the corresponding four-firm ratios 
from the Economic Census was 0.196. 
 14 
BEA software investment measures that do include contracted software.14 Tambe and Hitt 
(2012) find that a similar labor-based measure corresponds with a variety of other measures 
of IT.  
Data on the workforce come from the public use samples of the American 
Community Surveys for 2002, 2007, and 2012 (Ruggles et al. 2015). The measure of IT 
systems use for each NAICS industry is the share of hours worked by IT personnel, 
identified as people in the following occupations: computer systems analysts and computer 
scientists, operations and systems researchers and analysts, and computer software 
developers.15 Since the aim is to measure the use of custom IT systems, I exclude industries 
that are involved in creating information technology products.16 These industries employ IT 
personnel in designing and producing products, not just in building systems for their own 
use. Also, to reduce measurement error in small industries, the sample excludes the smallest 
5% of industries by employment.17  
The American Community Surveys use modified NAICS industry codes which are 
aggregated to different levels. Some industries are identified at the 6-digit level while others 
are only identified at the 3-digit level. I match these industries to the corresponding 
                                                
14 The BEA/BLS Integrated GDP-Productivity accounts report the capital income of software investment by 
year for 61 private industries (see https://www.bea.gov/industry/an2.htm#integrated). I aggregated my data 
up to the BEA/BLS industries (my data have nearly four times as many industries) and compared the share of 
IT workers in the industry workforce to the share of software compensation in total gross output. The 
association was highly significant with a correlation coefficient of .42.  
15 Hours worked is calculated as weeks worked last year time usual hours worked per week times the person 
weight. For 2012, weeks worked is intervalled; I assign a numeric value based on the means for 2007. 
16 These include NAICS 5112, software publishers, 5181, Internet service providers and web search portals, 
5182, Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services, 5191 Other information services, 5415 Computer 
Systems Design and Related Services, 3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing, 3342 
Communications Equipment Manufacturing, 3344 Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component 
Manufacturing, and 3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments manufacturing. 
17 That is, it excludes industries with fewer than 28,748 employees. 
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industries in the Economic Census to obtain a sample of 730 industry-year observations 
over three years at different (non-overlapping) levels of industry classification.18 
I also use data for the manufacturing sector for 1977, using the 1980 Census of 
Population to obtain measures of the IT share per industry. The 1977 Economic Census 
uses 4-digit SIC codes to classify industries while the Census uses its own industry 
classification and the later Economic Censuses use the NAICS classification. To make the 
1977 Economic Census data comparable both to the Census of Population and to the later 
Economic Censuses, I match the 1977 industries. Where the target data use a higher level of 
industry aggregation, I averaged the 1977 industry data on concentration, weighting by 
shipments per detailed industry. 
To study the growth in firm operating margins, the main sample consists of 
Compustat firms traded on US exchanges in 2000 and 2014, excluding financial firms, 
matched to industry IT systems data, totaling 1,532 firms. I exclude firms that are missing 
data on market value, sales, and assets, firms where R&D exceeds half of revenues (startup 
mode), and I exclude the 5 percent tails of the dependent variable (operating margin, that is, 
operating income after depreciation before taxes, R&D, and advertising expense all divided 
by revenues) to counter measurement error at the extremes. I use the method of Lewellen 
and Badrinath (1997) with the NIPA investment deflator to calculate the net capital stocks. 
Stocks of R&D and advertising and marketing expenditures are computed using the 
perpetual inventory method.19 Industry level IT capital is also calculated using the perpetual 
                                                
18 There are 75 3-digit industries, 459 4-digit, 151 5-digit, and 45 6-digit industries. Note that there are some 
minor changes in the NAICS classification between 2002 and 2012, so that some industries are not reported 
for all three years. 
19 The R&D stock is calculated assuming a 15% annual depreciation rate and an 8% pre-sample growth rate 
(Hall 1990); R&D expenditures are deflated using an R&D deflator. The advertising stock is based on 
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inventory method where annual investment consists of the deflated wages paid to IT 
personnel in the industry.20 As a control in the operating margin regressions, I use a measure 
of industry regulation developed by Al‐Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015) that is based on an 
industry-relevance weighted count of words in the Code of Federal Regulations.21 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics on the sample of industries. On average, 
IT workers account for 2.2% of hours worked. The table shows the four different 
concentration ratios. Relatively few industries could be described as monopolies or 
oligopolies; the top four firms account for the majority of revenues in only 15% of the 
industries. But industries have been growing more concentrated. The table shows the change 
in mean concentration ratios from 2002 to 2007, before the recession; the mean changes 
from 2007 to 2012 were smaller. Note that most of the increase in concentration can be 
attributed to the growing share of the top four firms; the increase in the share of the top 50 
firms is not much larger than the increase for the top four. Also, the number of 
establishments in each industry grew, on average. And consistent with prior literature 
(Schmalensee 1989), the top firms in each industry tend to have larger plants (revenues / 
establishment), higher labor productivity (revenues / employee), higher pay, but lower labor 
share of output. 
                                                                                                                                            
advertising and marketing expenditures and assumes a 45% annual depreciation rate and 5% pre-sample growth 
rate (Villalonga 2004, p. 217).  
20 I assume a 15% depreciation rate and a 2% pre-sample growth rate based on the average growth rate from 
2000-2014. I divide the IT capital by the number of workers in each industry each year to obtain a scaled 
measure of IT capital per worker. 
21 Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin use an algorithm to probabilistically assign each section of the Code to a specific 
NAICS industry. They do this assignment for sets of 2-digit, 3-digit, and 4-digit NAICS industries. The result is 
a time series of the extent of regulation for specific industries since 1970. 
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Table A1 in the Appendix displays the distribution of observations across industry 
sectors, defined as the first digit of the industry NAICS code. It also displays the average 
change in the four-firm concentration ratio for each sector from 2002 to 2007. Most sectors 
show rising concentration. 
Instrumental variable 
Firm investments in information technology might be endogenous, reflecting other 
factors that might also be related to industry concentration. This might confound the 
analysis of the impact of IT on concentration or the analysis of operating margins. For 
example, faster growing firms might invest more in IT in order to manage their more rapid 
growth; they would become larger, possibly increasing industry concentration, and their 
growth would be correlated with IT. But in this case, growth in market share would cause IT 
spending rather than the reverse. 
In order to correct for reverse causality and other confounding influences in the 
analysis of industry concentration and operating margins, I use an instrumental variable 
estimation. The ideal instrument should be correlated with (but independent of) IT and it 
would also plausibly satisfy the exclusion restriction; that is, the ideal instrument would not 
influence industry concentration except through IT. 
To instrument the IT share of hours, I use a measure of industry sedentariness 
derived from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (1977). The notion here is that it is easier 
to implement computer technology in industries with more sedentary employees because 
seated employees can more advantageously use desktop computers or terminals. These 
industries should therefore tend to adopt IT somewhat earlier and somewhat more 
intensively, all else equal.   
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I use a measure of sedentariness derived from the 1977 edition of the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles; this was before most occupations used computers so that computers 
likely had little effect on the sedentariness of occupations. The US Department of Labor has 
sought to define aspects of some 14,000 distinct jobs, publishing the fourth edition of this 
work in 1977. One job characteristic is STRENGTH, which rates the physical demands of 
the job on a scale of 1, for sedentary occupations, to 5, for very heavy work. I flagged an 
occupation as being sedentary if its STRENGTH rating is less than 2. England and 
Kilbourne (2013) have mapped these to Census detailed occupation codes, averaging them 
to this higher level of aggregation. Using these occupations, I calculated the distribution of 
sedentary occupations across NAICS industries using the 2000 Census 5% public use 
sample.  
This measure is correlated with the IT share of the workforce and the estimates 
show that the instrument is not weak. Table 2 shows correlation coefficients and first stage 
regressions. The first column, for the manufacturing sector only, is for 1977, using the 
sedentariness index weighted by the occupational distribution from the 1980 Census. The 
table shows regressions of the IT share of the workforce regressed on the sedentariness 
index and, in the bottom row, the simple correlation. Even though the level of IT use in 
1977 was low compared to more recent years, the first stage correlation is strong (.791). The 
correlation coefficients for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012 range from .422 to .448 and the 
regression coefficients are highly significant. One concern is that the rise of mobile 
computing might correspond to a weakening of the instrument, which is based conceptually 
on desktop computing. While the regression coefficient on the sedentariness variable did 
decline somewhat from 2002, this difference is not statistically significant and the 
correlations and regression R-squared statistics did not weaken.  
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Sedentariness and computer use vary substantially across sectors. Table A2 in the 
Appendix shows the mean sedentariness of each 1-digit NAICS sector as well as the index 
for the lowest and highest industry within each sector. Finance, real estate, and business 
services is the most sedentary sector (mean .70) while agriculture is the least sedentary (mean 
.14). However, the differences in the sedentariness index between the low and high 
industries within each sector show that there is significant variation in the index within 
sectors. For example, within manufacturing, Animal Slaughtering and Processing has a 
sedentariness index of .12, but Aerospace Products and Parts has a sedentariness index of 
.73. Moreover, the correlation between sedentariness and IT share of the workforce, 
estimated for 2002, 2007, and 2012, is substantial for all sectors except for Other Services. 
Thus, the link between this instrumental variable and IT share is not mainly driven by a few 
industries or sectors. 
One concern is that sedentariness might be linked to other occupational 
characteristics that somehow affect industry concentration. Specifically, while sedentary 
occupations are more likely to use computers, they are also more likely to handle paper 
documents. Sedentariness is likely correlated with the use of desks, paper, and pencils. 
Dinardo and Pischke (1997) famously found that pencil use is correlated with higher wages, 
likely reflecting unobserved worker characteristics of those workers who select into pencil-
using occupations. Sedentariness might well be correlated with such characteristics and also 
with higher wages.  
These correlated variables might cause a problem for the instrument if they were also 
correlated with the outcome variable, industry concentration. Evidence in Table 3 suggests 
that this second correlation is not a significant problem. This table regresses several 
measures of industry concentration and the growth in industry concentration against three 
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industry characteristics: the share of workers in professional and managerial occupations, the 
mean years of schooling of workers in the industry, and the mean log industry wage. The 
regressions also include dummy variables for year, industry sector, and the number of digits 
in the industry classification, as are used in the regressions on industry concentration below. 
Joint tests of the significance of these variables cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are 
all zero. Individually, the coefficients are not statistically significant except for weak 
significance (10% level) of the wage variable in the two broadest measures of industry 
concentration. These estimates appear to rule out the possibility that the correlation between 
sedentariness and industry concentration spuriously reflects the effect of 
professional/managerial work, education, or wages.  
Further evidence in support of the validity of the exclusion restriction comes from 
placebo tests. The left side of Table 4 reports regressions on industry concentration using 
data from the 1977 Economic Census for the manufacturing sector and also from the 
Economic Censuses of 2002, 2007, and 2012.22 The regressions show that the instrumental 
variable is not significantly correlated with the four-firm concentration ratio in 1977, but the 
association is highly significant for the more recent sample of manufacturing industries. The 
assumption in this paper is that the correlation during the recent period reflects the greater 
use of information technology since 1977. A similar pattern is seen in the right panel of the 
table which regresses firm operating margins on the instrumental variable with various 
controls corresponding to the analysis below. Again, the coefficient for 1977 is not 
significant while the coefficient for the recent period is highly significant.  
                                                
22 To perform comparable regressions, I first calculated the instrumental variable using the 1977 Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles but weighting each industry using the 1980 Census public use sample. The Economic 
Census reports concentration ratios for 4-digit SIC industries while the Census of the Population uses its own 
industry codes. Where the Population data use a higher level of industry aggregation, I averaged the industry 
data on concentration and plant size, weighting by shipments per detailed industry. 
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This finding does not definitively eliminate the possibility that some third factor 
could be responsible for a spurious link between IT systems use and industry concentration 
or operating margins. However, it does mean that such a third factor could not have had 
significant influence prior to 1980 and its influence must have grown more or less 
concurrently with the rapid growth in IT systems use after 1980.  
Empirical Findings  
Basic regressions on concentration ratios 
Table 5 shows basic regressions on the different concentration ratios. The regression 
estimates concentration ratio j for industry i during year t:  𝐶"BC = 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼𝑇"C + 𝛼C + 𝛿I + 𝛾J + 𝜖"C 
where 𝐼𝑇"C is the measure if IT systems use, 𝛿I is a dummy variable for industry sector (1-
digit NAICS code), and 𝛾J is a dummy variable for the number of digits in the industry 
definition. The latter dummy variable is included because more narrowly defined industries 
are likely to have higher concentration ratios, all else equal. Table A3 in the Appendix breaks 
out the regression for the 4-firm concentration ratio by different industry digit levels. All 
show an association between IT share and industry concentration, but the estimates for 
more narrowly defined industries are larger and have greater statistical significance. 
The top panel of Table 5 shows OLS regressions on the pooled (2002-2012) level of 
each concentration ratio with errors clustered by industry sector. The coefficient of the share 
of IT workers in the workforce is highly significant for all concentration ratios. It is also 
economically significant. The sample mean of IT share of hours worked is 2.2%. At this 
mean, IT share is associated with an increase in the revenue share of the top four firm of 
2.2% x 1.90 = 4.2%. This is comparable to the increase in four-firm concentration ratios 
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reported by Autor et al. (2017) for most sectors since 1982. Since the share of IT workers 
was much smaller in 1982, IT systems use appears to “explain” most of the increase in 
industry concentration since then, loosely speaking.23 
One concern with these estimates is the possibility that IT systems use might be 
endogenously related to the error term. Suppose, for instance, that some omitted variable 
caused more concentrated industries to have larger plants and larger plants used IT relatively 
more to administer their greater number of employees and assets. Then the coefficients on 
IT systems use would be biased upwards. To address this concern, the second panel reports 
the same regressions estimated using instrumental variables, instrumenting with the index of 
sedentariness. Using IV estimation, the coefficient estimates for IT share are somewhat 
smaller and somewhat weaker statistically, but are overall similar.24 The null hypothesis that 
the right-hand variables are exogenous cannot be rejected. 
The levels of industry concentration observed in the pooled sample roughly capture 
the increase in concentration brought about by the adoption of IT systems, occurring mainly 
since 1980 or so. A further test is to see whether IT is also related to the growth in 
concentration occurring during the sample period. The third panel makes IV estimates of the 
change in concentration ratios between 2002 and 2007. I exclude changes after 2007 because 
of possible confounding effects of the recession. The coefficient on IT systems use is again 
statistically significant and economically substantial. In this panel, the hypothesis that the 
right-hand variables are exogenous is weakly rejected in the first two columns (P = .083, 
                                                
23 One concern is that many firms in education and health care are nonprofit, perhaps biasing the results. 
Repeating these regressions but excluding those industries (results not shown) makes little difference in the 
coefficients. 
24 The IV sample is slightly smaller than the OLS sample because of missing values for the instrument. If the 
OLS estimates are repeated with the same sample as the IV analysis, the OLS coefficients are quite similar to 
those in the larger sample. 
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.098). At the sample mean, IT share is associated with an increase in the four-firm 
concentration ratio of 0.85 x 2.2% = 1.9%. This is larger than the actual change in the mean 
four firm concentration ratio shown in Table 1. 
In all three panels, it is evident that most of the increase in concentration ratios 
associated with IT is driven by the top four firms. That is, the coefficient for the eight-firm 
ratio is only slightly larger than the one for the four-firm ratio, implying that the market 
shares of firms five through eight grew relatively little. Similarly, for the other concentration 
ratios. For this reason, the remainder of the paper focuses on just the role of the top four 
firms. 
Long differences 
Table 6 extends this analysis by looking at the change in the four-firm concentration 
ratio from 1977 to 2002. This sample is for the manufacturing sector only, due to limitations 
in the available public data.25 The first column uses the 1980 estimate of IT share and the 
second column measures the difference between IT shares in 1980 and 2002. The third 
column repeats the regression of column 1 using IV estimations. In all of these regressions, 
the coefficient on IT share is significant. The bottom of the table shows the sample means 
of the IT measures and product of these means and the IT share coefficient. In each 
estimation, IT share accounts for a 3 – 5% rise in industry concentration, roughly 
corresponding to the actual increase found by Autor et al. (2017). In other words, IT use 
appears to account for much of the rise in industry concentration. 
                                                
25 The sample also excludes industries where software development is part of the product and it excludes the 
1% tails in the dependent variable (1 observation each) in order to limit measurement error. 
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Other variables 
A variety of other variables might confound the analysis, possibly being correlated 
with IT systems use and also with industry concentration. Table 7 considers some possibly 
confounding variables: the number of establishments, merger and acquisition activity, 
exposure to imports, and industry growth. As Schmalensee (1989) notes, these variables may 
well be endogenous. For example, IT-based economies of scale might encourage firms 
acquire other firms or to merge. Nevertheless, including these variables in regressions along 
with the measure of IT systems use provides a robustness check on the IT coefficient. 
Column 1 includes the number of industry establishments. The more establishments 
in an industry, the harder it might be for a few firms to capture a large market share. Also, 
rising entry barriers would tend to reduce the number of establishments, driving 
concentration up. Including this variable does not significantly change the coefficient on IT 
systems use and the coefficient on the number of establishments is weakly significant (P = 
.092), negative, and small. A supplementary regression (not shown) on the change in industry 
concentration from 2002 to 2007 against the change in industry establishments shows no 
significant relationship. Thus, entry barriers do not seem to be a first order cause of the 
recent rise in industry concentration nor does the number of establishments confound the 
IT relationship. 
Column 2 includes a measure of merger and acquisition activity. Grullon et al. (2017) 
argue that mergers and acquisitions are a major reason industry concentration is rising, which 
they attribute to lax antitrust enforcement. To measure industry M&A activity, I use data 
from Thomson Reuters SDC database of M&A transactions. Since acquisitions by large 
firms are those most likely to affect industry concentration and since large firms are more 
likely to be publicly listed, I extracted those acquisitions made by publicly listed firms. 
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Excluding transactions where the acquirer did not obtain majority ownership or where 
ownership percentage was not reported, I matched these data with Compustat data for 
publicly listed firms, resulting in a list of 33,942 acquisitions by publicly listed firms from 
1985 through 2001.26 I use these data to construct an index of M&A activity prior to 2002. 
Using the Compustat historical NAICS assignments for each firm, I tabulated the number of 
acquisitions and the number of active publicly listed firms for each industry. I then calculated 
the index of M&A activity as the aggregate number of acquisitions per public firm for each 
industry over the entire period. The regression finds a negative coefficient on M&A activity 
that is not statistically different from zero. The coefficient on IT systems use changes only 
slightly. Using this measure, mergers and acquisitions do not seem to account for rising 
concentration nor do they confound the estimates of the effects of IT systems use. 
Exposure to global trade might also confound the estimation. Autor et al. (2017) 
suggest that globalization might increase competition thus increasing industry concentration. 
Column 3 includes a measure of industry import penetration ( (imports–exports)/shipments) 
for NAICS manufacturing industries (Schott 2011) for 2002 through 2005. For non-
manufacturing industries, I set import penetration to zero. This measure of import 
penetration has no effect on the coefficient of IT systems use and is not significantly 
correlated with industry concentration. 
Columns 4 adds the average annual growth rate for real shipments from 1980 to 
2002 for manufacturing industries.27 It might be harder to maintain market share in a rapidly 
growing industry and rapidly growing industries might have greater need of IT. The 
                                                
26 These are acquisitions by publicly listed firms of private and publicly listed firms. In aggregate, private firms 
do more acquisitions—85% of them in these data. 
27 Data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Productivity database. 
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coefficient on industry growth is negative and weakly significant (P = .077). The coefficient 
on IT systems use is larger, suggesting that, if anything, the omission of industry growth 
biases the coefficient downwards.28 
Column 5 includes all of the right-hand side variable tested in columns 1-3 for the 
whole sample. The coefficient on the number of establishments in the industry is now 
statistically significant, but the coefficient on IT share remains roughly the same, suggesting 
that none of these additional variables confound the analysis of the role of IT. 
Growth in Operating Margins 
Table 8 provides an analysis of the growth in operating margins. The sample in this 
case consists of publicly listed US firms that reported in both 2000 and 2014, excluding firms 
in the finance sector.29 The dependent variable is the change in operating margin between 
2000 and 2014 where operating margin is defined as operating income after depreciation but 
before taxes, R&D, advertising and marketing expenditures all divided by revenues. I exclude 
R&D, advertising and marketing from income because I treat these as intangible investments 
on the right-hand side of the regression equations. That is, operating profits should reflect 
the returns on investments in capital as well as returns to stocks of intangibles. The model 
above finds that operating margins should be greater with firm productivity and IT use, but 
the model does not explicitly incorporate capital measures. The model can be readily 
extended so that the operating margin for firm i at time t is 
𝑀"C = 𝛼 ∙ 𝐼𝑇"C + 	𝛿 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐾"C3𝑅"C + 𝛽O 𝐾"CO𝑅"C + ⋯+ 𝜖"C 
                                                
28 If I include the growth in the industry capital stock, that has a significant negative coefficient and the 
coefficient for the IT share is even larger. 
29 In addition, the sample excludes the 5% tails in the dependent variable and firms where R&D spending 
exceeds 50% of revenues. 
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where 𝐾"3, 𝐾"O, … represent stocks of capital assets as well as stocks of intangible assets, R&D 
and advertising and marketing. The 𝛽B represent the rental rates for each type of capital. 𝛼 
represents the effect of IT and, by hypothesis, 𝛼 > 0. 𝛿 represents a time trend rate; if a 
general decline in competition were causing a rise in margins, then we should find 𝛿 > 0. 
Because we are interested mainly in the growth of margins over this period (2000-2014) and 
because there are also likely significant firm fixed effects, I estimate the differenced equation 
over this interval: 
∆𝑀" = 𝛼 ∙ ∆𝐼𝑇" + 	𝛿 + 𝛽3∆𝐾"3𝑅" + 𝛽O∆𝐾"O𝑅" + ⋯+ ∆𝜖". 
Table 8 reports some basic estimates. Column 1 reports a simple OLS regression and 
Column 2 reports the instrumental variable regression. Note that the IT measure is an 
industry-level measure. Both are highly significant, but the IV estimate is substantially larger. 
At the sample mean for the change in IT share (.007), these coefficients represent an 
increase in operating margins of 0.9% and 3.5% respectively. By comparison, the actual 
increase in operating margins for this sample is 3.2%, suggesting that IT can account for a 
major portion of the observed increase. 
Column 3 uses the level of IT share rather than the change in that variable. Column 
4 repeats the regression in Column 2, but adds an additional variable, a measure of the 
change in industry regulation based on word counts in the Federal Code. If Federal 
regulation imposes substantial fixed compliance costs, then this might serve as an entry 
barrier, raising margins (Bessen 2016, Guttierez and Philippon 2017). There does seem to be 
a significant association between regulation and margins; at the sample mean, the increase in 
regulation may have contributed 1.6% to the growth in operating margins. But inclusion of 
this variable does not significantly alter the coefficient on IT share. 
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Finally, the constant term represents the background trend. This term is either not 
significantly different from zero or significant and negative. It appears that once IT and 
intangibles are accounted for, the trend is not positive, contrary to the notion that a general 
decline in competition has led to rising firm margins. 
The Productivity Gap 
The above data support the link between IT systems and industry concentration. If 
the paper’s hypothesis is correct, IT systems should increase industry concentration by 
increasing the productivity gap between the top firms and the rest. From the model, the link 
between IT and a productivity gap should show up as a link between IT and establishment 
size and also as a link between IT and labor productivity. 
Table 9 explores the relationship between the IT share of the workforce and average 
establishment size, comparing the relationship for the top four firms in each industry with 
the relationship for the remaining firms. Because the Economic Census does not provide 
complete data for the manufacturing sector, that sector is necessarily excluded from the 
analysis that follows. 
The table reports joint estimates using Zellner’s “Seemingly Unrelated Regression” 
of equations relating the log of deflated revenues per establishment for each group of firms 
(Top 4 and the rest) separately: ln 𝑅"CCUV	W = 𝛼CUV	W ∙ 𝐼𝑇"C + 𝜇" + 𝛿C + 𝜖"C ln 𝑅"CYZ[ = 𝛼YZ[ ∙ 𝐼𝑇"C + 𝜇′" + 𝛿′C + 𝜖′"C 
I use a log specification because establishment revenues are highly skewed. The first 
column shows the unrestricted regressions with controls for industry sector and year. The 
second column shows the regression where the coefficients for the industry sector and year 
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dummies are constrained to be equal across equations. The bottom row reports a Wald test 
of the null hypothesis that 𝛼CUV	W = 𝛼YZ[. 
In both columns, estimates of 𝛼CUV	W and 𝛼YZ[ are both highly significant and the 
Wald test strongly rejects the null hypothesis. IT is strongly associated with greater revenue 
per establishment and the association is substantially stronger for the larger, presumably 
more productive, firms. 
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis using log revenues per employee as the 
dependent variable. The results are broadly similar. Although this is not a causal analysis, 
these findings support the notion that IT may be implicated in the rising productivity gap 
between the top firms and the rest. 
Conclusion 
It is sometimes argued that information technology “levels the playing field” by 
providing inexpensive tools to small and young firms. This paper finds that much of the 
impact of IT may be, instead, to tilt the playing field in favor of those firms who are able to 
use it most effectively. The use of IT systems is strongly associated with industry 
concentration across a wide range of sectors.30 Moreover, the magnitude of the link between 
industry IT systems use and concentration is large enough to account for much of the recent 
rise in industry concentration. Instrumental variable regressions provide some support for 
the notion that this relationship is causal, consistent with a view that IT generates a growing 
gap between the most productive firms and the rest. This view is further supported by 
evidence that IT systems use is associated with enhanced performance of the top firms 
                                                
30 Some recent evidence suggests that cloud computing might be altering the relationship in favor of small 
firms (Jin and McElheran 2017). 
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within each industry. IT systems use is associated with relatively greater plant size among the 
top four firms, with relatively greater revenue per employee at these firms, and with higher 
firm operating margins, especially for the largest firms. These findings suggest that IT 
contributes to a widening productivity gap between the top firms and the rest, driving an 
increase in industry concentration. 
On the other hand, the observed increases in concentration are fairly modest. There 
are, of course, well known examples where IT facilitates highly concentrated markets as with 
Amazon’s dominance in e-commerce. These cases may be described as “winner-take-all” 
markets. But the markets in this study show much lower levels of concentration and 
relatively small increases. While economies of scale or network effects might be at play in the 
markets studied here, it appears that there are limits to such scale effects; IT does not appear 
to generate a natural monopoly in most markets. These are “winner-take-a-bit-more” 
markets. Perhaps more narrowly defined markets would be more likely to exhibit “winner-
take-all” competition, but the market definitions used here from the Economic Census (at 
the 6-digit NAICS and higher level of aggregation) are the markets that have raised concern 
about growing concentration.31  
The findings of this paper suggest that much of the recent rise in industry 
concentration and much of the rise in firm operating margins can be attributed to the 
deployment of proprietary IT systems. A general decline in competition might also play a 
role in rising concentration and profits, but the evidence found here regarding competition is 
mixed. Merger and acquisition activity seems unrelated to industry concentration and the 
residual time trend in operating margins is not positive once intangible investments are taken 
                                                
31 Shapiro (2017) questions the relevance of Economic Census of concentration as reliable indicators of 
competition. 
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into account. On the other hand, greater Federal regulation is associated with higher 
operating margins, although this effect is substantially smaller than the role of IT systems. 
Overall, the analysis here suggests that the recent overall rise in industry concentration is not 
mainly the result of anticompetitive activity that should worry antitrust authorities. Indeed, 
IT systems use appears to bring real social economic benefits in terms of greater output per 
worker even if it does raise industry concentration. While there may be other reasons to 
question antitrust policies (see, for instance, Kwoka 2012), the general rise in industry 
concentration does not appear to raise troubling issues for antitrust enforcement at this 
point by itself. 
However, the evidence about the role of IT in raising industry concentration does 
broach another concern. Why aren’t the productivity gains from IT shared more broadly 
beyond the top firms? Increasingly, it seems, top performing firms utilize new technologies 
productively while their rivals do not. Concentration appears to be rising because of 
“barriers to technology” if not actually barriers to entry. More research is needed to 
understand exactly how IT is related to the growing productivity gap. Top firms might be 
able to use patents and trade secrets to prevent the spread of new knowledge. Or perhaps, 
instead, top firms are better able to recruit and develop talented managers and workers 
skilled at working with the new systems. Whatever the cause, the issue is important because 
the slow diffusion of new technologies might be related to sluggish aggregate productivity 
growth (Decker et al. 2017). Also, growing disparity in firm productivity might be related to 
growing inter-firm wage inequality. But the policies to address these issues, whether antitrust 
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Appendix 
Solving the first order condition, the optimal level of variable labor for firm i is 
(A1) 
𝑉" = 𝐴"2 (38*2) 𝛾𝜎𝑤 3 (38*2). 
And from this it follows that the revenue and revenue per employee are 
(A2) 
𝑅" ≡ 𝑃" ∙ 𝑌" = 𝑤𝛾𝜎 𝑉" ,							𝑅"𝐿" = 𝑤𝛾𝜎 ∙ 11 + 𝐹 𝑉"	. 
Given that 𝛾 and 𝜎 are both positive and less than one, revenue size and gross labor 
productivity both increase with firm productivity, 𝐴" as long as F>0. More productive firms 
will have larger market share. 
Firm operating margin is 
(A3) 
𝑀" ≡ 𝑃" ∙ 𝑌" − 𝑤𝐿"𝑃" ∙ 𝑌" = 1 − 	𝛾𝜎 1 + 𝐹𝑉"  





Table 1. Summary Statistics 






















Note: Sample for levels includes 730 observations over the years 2002, 2007, and 2012; sample for changes in 
concentration ratios is 439; sample for industry characteristics excludes manufacturing because Economic 
Census does not report number of establishments for top 4 firms. Dollar figures are deflated by the GDP 




Table 2. First stage regressions 





	Sedentariness	 5.13	(0.48)**	 6.52	(0.78)**	 4.97	(0.57)**	 4.85	(0.60)**	















	Simple	correlation	 0.791	 		 .463	 	 .422	 	 .448	 	
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 1% level. Sectors are 1-digit 
NAICS sectors. The 1977 data are for the manufacturing sector only and the sedentariness index is calculated 
using occupational weights from the 1980 Census. The other columns are for all sectors and the index is 

















	          Share	professional	
&	managers	 0.07	(0.18)	 0.09	(0.21)	 0.12	(0.24)	 0.07	(0.25)	 0.10	(0.44)	
Mean	years	school	 -2.44	(3.87)	 -3.04	(4.79)	 -4.22	(5.04)	 -4.94	(4.82)	 9.99	(11.79)	
Log	wage	 24.95	(14.89)	 29.27	(16.83)	 34.31	(16.65)°	 32.21	(14.87)°	 -32.49	(43.97)	
Industry	digit	
dummies	 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
   Year	dummies ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
   Sector	dummies ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 




























	Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ° = significant at 10% level; * = significant at 5% level; ** = 









	 1977	 2002,	2007,	2012	 1977	 2000-2014	
Sedentariness	 0.19	(0.21)	 0.80	(0.12)**	 -0.03	(0.08)	 0.15	(0.02)**	
Year	dummies	 	  ✓    ✓  
SIC2	dummies	 	    ✓  ✓  
Capital	and	
intangible	stocks	 	    ✓  ✓  
Observations	 79	 	 273	 	 890	 	 64,189	 	
R-squared	 0.012	 	 0.177	 	 0.46	 	 0.095	 	
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 1% level. For the 
1977 regressions, the percent of sedentary workers by industry is calculated from the occupation-industry 
distribution of the 1980 Census public use sample; for the recent regressions, it is calculated from the 2000 
Census public use sample. The sedentariness index is assigned to firms via the Census NAICS classification; 
consequently, the firms in the 1977 sample also appear in year 1998 or later when NAICS codes were assigned. 




Table 5. Regressions on Concentration Ratios 
Dependent	Variable:	Concentration	Ratio	
A.	OLS	 Top	4	firms	 Top	8	firms	 Top	20	firms	 Top	50	firms	





































	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	B.	IV	











































		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Dependent	Variable:	Change	in	Concentration	Ratio	(2002-2007)	
C.	IV	 Top	4	firms	 Top	8	firms	 Top	20	firms	 Top	50	firms	
Lagged	IT	share	 0.83	(0.17)**	 0.77	(0.06)**	 0.66	(0.06)**	 0.70	(0.12)**	
No.	of	observations	 227		 227		 227		 224		
Prob.	variables	are	exogenous	 0.082		 0.098		 0.137		 0.139		
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 1% level. Standard errors 
are clustered by sector except in panel B, where heteroskedastic-robust errors are reported; with the full set of 
instruments, the IV regression with clustered errors has too many clusters to compute the weighting matrix. 
Regressions are on pooled industries for 2002, 2007, 2012. Dependent variable is share of revenues accounted 
for by top firms (varying number). IT share is instrumented using a measure of the sedentariness of the 




Table 6. Long Difference in Four-firm Concentration Ratio 
Dependent	Variable:	Change	in	Four	Firm	Concentration	Ratio	
	 Manufacturing	only,	1977	-	2002	












	R-squared	 0.154  0.053  0.15  











Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ° = significant at 10% level; * = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 
1% level. OLS errors are robust to heteroscedasticity; IV errors are bootstrapped. Dependent variable is the 
change in share of revenues accounted for by top 4 firms. IT share is instrumented using a measure of the 
sedentariness of the industry workforce, using occupational measures from 1977 apportioned to industries 
using the 1980 Census. Excludes the 1% tails of the dependent variable. The null hypothesis that IT share is 




Table 7. Possibly Confounding Variables 
 
Dependent	Variable:	Four	Firm	Concentration	Ratio	 	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
IT	share	 1.80	(0.53)*	 1.70	(0.63)*	 2.00	(0.57)*	 2.24	(0.53)**	 1.70	(0.33)**	
Number	of	
establishments	(1000s)	 -0.08	(0.04)°	 		 		 	 	 -0.08	(0.01)**	
M&A	index,	1985-2001	 		 -2.82	(4.41)	 		 	 	 -3.01	(2.53)	
Import	penetration	 		 		 -1.85	(1.93)	 	 	 -1.34	(3.76)	
Output	growth,		
		1980-2002	 		 		 		 -1.24	(.70)°	 	 	
Industry	digit	dummies	 ✓		 ✓		 ✓		 ✓	 	 ✓	 	
Year	dummies	 ✓		 ✓	 	 ✓	 	 ✓	 	 ✓	 	
Sector	dummies	 ✓ 	 ✓	 	 ✓	 	 ✓	 	 ✓	 	
No.	of	observations	 727		 664		 725		 279		 660		
R-squared	 0.284		 0.271		 0.257		 0.373		 .286		
Note: Standard errors, clustered by sector, in parentheses, ° = significant at 10% level; * = significant at 5% 





Table 8. Change in Operating Margins, 2000 – 2014  
Dependent	Variable:	D	Operating	income	after	depreciation	before	taxes,	R&D,	advert.	/	Revenues	
	 OLS	 	 IV	 	 IV	 	 IV	 	IT	share	 		 	 	 0.85	(0.19)**	 	 	
D	IT	share	 1.26	(0.30)**	 5.11	(1.13)** 
	 	
5.10	(1.21)**	
D	Capital	stock	 0.01	 (0.00)** 0.01	(0.00)**	 0.01	(0.00)** 0.00 (0.00)** 
D	R&D	stock	 -0.04	 (0.01)** -0.05	(0.01)**	 -0.04 (0.01)** -0.05 (0.02)** 
D	Advertising	stock	 0.15	 (0.05)** 0.15 (0.08) 0.16 (0.07)* 0.16 (0.09) 
D	Regulation	
		 	 	 	 	
0.06	(0.01)**	
Constant	 0.00	(0.00)	 -0.02	(0.01)	 -0.02	(0.01)**	 -0.03	(0.01)**	














	Note: **=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. Sample is all US Compustat firms excluding 5% 
tails of operating margin and firms where R&D > .5*sales; long difference regression trims the 5% tails of the 
dependent variable. IV uses sedentariness index as instrument; null hypothesis that IT share is exogenous is 
rejected (P = .000, .052, .000) in columns 2-4 respectively.  
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	 Unrestricted	 Restricted	 Unrestricted Restricted 
Top	4	firms	 	        
IT	share	 0.25	(0.03)**	 0.48	(0.03)**	 0.15	(0.02)**	 0.25	(0.02)**	
Year	dummies	 ✓	  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Sector	dummies	 ✓	  ✓  ✓  ✓  
No.	of	observations	 439	 	 439  439  439  
R-squared	 0.256	 	 0.025	 	 0.296	 	 0.212	 	
         
Remaining	firms	 	        
IT	share	 0.14	(0.02)**	 0.07	(0.03)**	 0.11	(0.02)**	 0.13	(0.02)**	
Year	dummies	 ✓	  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Sector	dummies	 ✓	  ✓  ✓  ✓  
No.	of	observations	 439	 	 439  439  439  
R-squared	 0.292	 	 0.245	 	 0.359	 	 0.353	 	
         
Test	equality	of	IT	share	
coefficients	(Prob.	value)	 0.000	 	 0.000	 	 0.001	 	 0.000	 	
Note: **=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. Estimates use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
model for separate equations for the top 4 firms in each industry and for the remaining firms in each industry. 
The sample excludes manufacturing industries (data was not reported). The restricted estimates constrain the 
coefficients of the dummy variables to be equal across the two equations. The bottom row reports the 









Figure 1. Operating Margins 
 
Note: Solid lines are kernel smoothed. Black line is from the System of National Accounts, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. It shows the ratio of the net operating surplus to gross value 
added for the corporate sector (nonfinancial and financial). The gray line is the ratio of 
aggregate operating income after depreciation before taxes to revenues for firms publicly 
listed in the US.  
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	IT	share	 2.28	(1.24)°	 0.54	(0.33)°	 2.40	(0.99)*	 6.30	(0.98)**	
Year	dummies	














	Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ° = significant at 10% level; * = significant at 5% level; ** = 
significant at 1% level. 
 
 
